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Trying to Save the World with Company Law? Some Problems.1 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to unravel two connected errors in the current critical position on 
companies. Since the financial crisis there have been a growing number of voices in the 
academic community raised against the shareholder value driven corporate sector. The 
often conservative and highly doctrinal voices of English company lawyers have become 
in parts more radicalised and have found common research ground with varied academic 
disciplines and with company lawyers in other jurisdictions more accustomed to critical 
approaches. New ideas have been forged, old ideas have been rediscovered and re-
examined. In the emerging networks, the neoliberal domination of the study of companies 
is being substantially challenged. As exciting as this is, I am concerned that critical scholars 
have cohered around a core claim about company law which is erroneous. Furthermore, 
they have largely assumed that the current economy can sustain a social agenda as well as 
creating profit. This, I argue, hugely underestimates entrenched problems in the economy. 
In unravelling these issues my aim is to re-orientate challenges to shareholder primacy and 
to the claims of capital more generally.  
 
My purpose in this article is to address two errors in current critical thinking. First, that company 
law in its current form offers some form of resistance to shareholder maximisation. It does not. 
Secondly, that the company can deliver for capital and for society as a whole in the current 
economic climate. It cannot. In the first section I start to develop my argument that the pro law 
                                                 
1 7KLVWLWOHWDNHVLWVFXHIURP.HQW*UHHQILHOG·VSXEOLVKHGGebate (with D. Gordon Smith) 
¶6DYLQJWKH:RUOGZLWK&RUSRUDWH/DZ"· (2008) 57.4 Emory Law Journal  948 
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position of many critical lawyers who interpret the common law duty of directors to promote the 
interest of the company as having some socially progressive potential is misguided. I argue that it 
is not just external factors that promote shareholder value but that it is also the law. I argue that 
PRVWFULWLFDOVFKRODUV·FULWLFLVPRIVKDUeholder value is not a criticism of profit per se but of profit 
which is extracted in socially undesirable and destructive ways. I then argue that the premise of 
this position is that profit should and could be achieved through socially desirable mechanism. 
This underestimates the problems of modern global capitalism. In section two I argue that the 
company rose to prominence because of a crisis in capitalism and since then the company form 
has proven its adeptness in protecting capital in periods of crises by enabling value extraction for 
capital while protecting it from risk. I use a historical narrative to demonstrate this and in so doing 
account for the development of FRPSDQ\ODZRQGLUHFWRUV·GXWLHVDQGWKHGRFWULQHRIVHSDUDWH
FRUSRUDWHSHUVRQDOLW\,VKRZWKDWZKHQDGLUHFWRUV·ILGXFLDU\duty ZDVRZHGWR¶WKHFRPSDQ\·WKH
common law was reflecting a period when surplus was extracted from the production of things. 
The law was not describing a more social approach to fiduciary duties, rather it was describing the 
RSWLPDO DSSURDFK WRDFKLHYLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV· HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVW LQ WKDWSHULRG ,W LV WKHUHIRUH D
mistake to see company law (as it stands) as a solution to the anti-social company. In section three 
I trace the neoliberal dominance of the economic, political and legal sphere after the economy 
floundered in the early 1970s. I show how governments protected capital at the expense of labour 
and how the company form provided opportunities to extract value for shareholders 
notwithstanding a generalised fall in profit rates and growth. In respect of the arguments that there 
is a better way of making the same (or more) shareholder value, I argue that in this economic 
context shareholder value is best achieved in companies by doing anti-social things like engaging 
in asset transfers, financial engineering, investing in financial products and by returning capital to 
shareholders through share repurchase. This change of strategies to maximise shareholders value 
is reflected, I will argue, in modern company law. In section four I show how the company form 
continues to enable capital to deliver for shareholders ² in spite of falling productivity ² through 
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share repurchases, high dividends and a merger boom, thus creating a more fragile economy and 
heralding a new crisis.  In examining these issues, I intend to demonstrate that the entrenched 
profit falls to which neoliberal polices were responding were real and remain. This means that 
critical scholars will need to embrace truly radical reform.  
 
Section 1  
Overview of Current Problems 
It is often argued by company lawyers that there is a disjuncture between what companies do or 
aim to do, and what the law says they should do. Or, to be more specific, (because companies are 
artificial entities run by natural persons, the directors), when company directors prioritise the 
pursuit of shareholder value it is not because the law says they should. They do so because of 
external constraints such as pressure from the equities market, or internal constraints such as 
shareholder activism, personal incentives such as performance related remuneration, or because 
of a powerful neoliberal ideology which promotes shareholder primacy and which provided the 
rationale behind the shareholder primacy enshrined in codes of conduct such as national and 
international corporate governance Codes. In all the midst of all these pressures to profit maximise 
the law is held up as the bastion of social conscience. It alone, many critical company lawyers 
maintain, requires directors to act in the interests of the company, a more socially inclusive concept 
than the shareholder-centric policies currently pursued by management.  
This pro law position was famously articulated by Merrick Dodd who asserted that corporate law 
FRQVWUXHGDGLUHFWRUV·GXW\WRDFWLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHFRPSDQ\DVHQFRPSDVVLQJWKHLQWHUHVWVRI
employees and consumers as well as shareholders.2 The law, he claimed, was sufficiently socially 
RULHQWDWHG DV WR UHTXLUH QR IXUWKHU FRQWUROV RQ GLUHFWRUV· GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ Similarly, while 
critiquing the shareholder focus of modern corporate theory Blair and Stout maintain that the law 
                                                 
2 (0'RGG¶)RU:KRDUH0DQDJHUV7UXVWHHV·+DUYDUG/DZ5HYLHZ 
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conceptualises the corporation as a ¶WHDPSURGXFWLRQ· unit.3  They argue that team production is 
expressed in legal doctrine which acknowledges an independent board (independent so they can 
properly monitor team activity) and low shareholder rights over directors (so that shareholders 
cannot unduly influeQFH GLUHFWRUV· PHGLDWLQJ UROH4 Corporate law, they maintain, requires 
directors to protect the ¶enterprise specific investments· RIDOO WKHPHPEHUVRI WKH ¶FRUSRUDWH WHDP·5 
More recently Stout has claimed that shareholdeUSULPDF\KDVVLPSO\¶JRWFRUSRUDWHODZZURQJ·6  
In promoting environmentalism and sustainability, critical scholars have also claimed that the law 
RQGLUHFWRUV·GXWLHVLVVXIILFLHQWO\H[SDQVLYHWRDOORZdirectors to incorporate sustainability in their 
decision-making.7  Finally, critical scholars from Berle onwards have noted that corporate law does 
not hold that shareholders are owners of the company.8 As this is a fallacy perpetuated by ideology, 
                                                 
3 0%ODLU	/6WRXW¶$7HDP3URGXFWLRQ7KHRU\RI&RUSRUDWHODZ·-&RUS/
Utilised in Alchian aQG'HPVHW]·VHDUOLHUFKDUDFWHULVation of the corporation.   
4 Ibid p754 
5 Ibid p757 
6 L Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, 
Corporations and the Public (Berrerr Koehler 2012) p24 
7 Sjåfjell, B & A Sørensen, L Cecilie 'LUHFWRUV·'XWLHVDQG&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO
Responsibility (CSR) in Hanne Birkmose; Mette Neville & Karsten Engsig Sørensen (ed.),  Boards 
of directors in European companies ² reshaping and harmonising their organisation and duties.  Kluwer Law 
International.  Chapter 7 ² RQHDPRQJPDQ\RI3URIHVVRU6MnIMHOO·VSUROLILFZULWLQJRQWKLV
VXEMHFW$-RKQVWRQ¶5HIRUPLQJ(QJOLVK&RPSDQ\/DZWR3URPRWH6XVWDLQDEOH&RPSDQLHV·
(2014) 11(2) European Company Law 63  
8 AA Berle The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan 1932), P Ireland 
¶&RPSDQ\/DZDQG WKH0\WKRI6KDUHKROGHU2ZQHUVKLS· (1999), 62 MLR: 32.  In Critical 
&RPSDQ\/DZVHFRQGHGLWLRQ5RXWOHGJH,DUJXHWKDWZKLOHVKDUHKROGHU·VLQWHUHVWDUHLQ
the surplus created by the assets, in a capitalist economy dominated by surplus creation, that is a 
substantial, indeed, overriding claim.   
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not law, it is ideology and not law which promotes shareholderV· primacy on the basis of 
ownership.9  The law, in fact, assumes a more modest set of claims for shareholders. 
In contrast to these various pro law positions, I argue that the law does not provide the social 
alternative to the market that many company lawyers hope that it might. Undoubtedly, the various 
market factors noted earlier are powerful constraints on managerial decision-making in that they 
insist on shareholder primacy. But so too does the law. Company law is not and has never been 
the champion of social activists. If it appeared for a period to be representing a more social position 
by maintaining WKDWDGLUHFWRUV·GXW\ZDVRZHG WR WKH ¶company as a whole· and not the more 
narrowly GUDZQVKDUHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWLWZDVVLPSO\WKDWWKHODZFDQEHVORZWRUHVSRQGWRFKDQJH
It has since responded in the form of section 172 of the 2006 Act which asserts the bald 
shareholder primacy norm10 and which applies to the vast swathe of global capital which falls under 
UK company law.11 As I will argue, the old common law ¶duty to the company· was an expression 
of the old relationship of capital to labour, the old productive relations that predated neoliberalism. 
It was not necessarily less shareholder primacy orientated, (though for a short period because of a 
shift in politics it was12) it was simply that shareholderV· HFRQRPLF interests were met through 
different mechanisms than they are today.  
This brings us to the second, but connected problem in the current debate. Company lawyers 
critical of corporate activities have identified the problem with companies as their pursuit of 
                                                 
9 Stout n 6 above p25 
10 L Talbot Critical Company Law (Routledge 2007 and 2014)  
11 The FTSE 100 has a net market capitalisation of £1,720,093 million calculated as on 31 March 
2015.  FTSE Factsheet. The London Stock Exchange lists 2,226 companies with a market value 
of £4, 260,061million most of whom are incorporated in the UK and are subject to the 
Companies Act 2006 (data from the LSE 31 March 2015) 
12 In the period following second world most western countries adopted a more egalitarian, social 
democratic approach in which the notion of a social company was encapsulated. I refer to this 
SHULRGDV¶SURJUHVVLYH·LQSUHYLRXVSXEOLFDWLRQVEXW,GRQRWH[DPLQHLWLQWKLVSDSHU
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shareholder value as the primary or sole goal.13 However, I believe shareholder value has a 
heterogeneous meaning. Furthermore, many of the understandings of shareholder value are based 
on an unrealistic appreciation of the choices available to company directors given the historic low 
profits accruing to non-financial companies or productive capitalism.  
Shareholder value is intrinsically bound up with profit14 whether it is subsequently used to increase 
the value of the company equity or distributed as dividends.15 However, what many company 
scholars mean when they are critical of shareholder value is not the pursuit of profit per se but 
profit which is derived from particular practices. Undesirable practices may be investing in financial 
commodities, financial restructuring, creating negative externalities and/or generally adopting 
short-term strategies. Having made this distinction, the logical argument is then to argue that profit 
could be made from more social practices ² the law having already been established as being in 
favour of this option. Directors should and could, for example, seek to profit from strategies which 
take account of all WKRVHLQYROYHGLQWKHFRPSDQ\·VRSHUDWLRQVRUDIIHFWHGE\LWVDFWLYLWLHV, they 
could and should consider its effect on the environment and WKH FRPSDQ\·V long term 
development.  
                                                 
13 There remains, of course, a majority who see shareholder value as an unproblematic and 
desirable goal. I am not addressing this paper to these arguments in any respect.  
14 Bligh v Brent (1837) 2 Y & C 268 
15 That profit may not be enjoyed directly by shareholders in the form of dividend distributions 
but it underpins the value of the shares in various ways. Warren Buffet, as chairman of Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc, for example, famously does not use profits for dividends but to raise share value 
which he believes creates more shareholder value. From 1965 to 2012 he estimates that this has 
enabled Hathaway to massively outperform other S & P 500 companies. The overall gain in 
these years for Hathaway he estimates to be 586,817% while for the latter companies on average 
it was 7,433%.&KDLUPDQ·VOHWWHUWRVKDUHKROGHUV
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2012ltr.pdf 
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This inclusive perspective has a long historical trajectory,16 but more recently it has cohered around 
WKHWHUP¶VWDNHKROGLQJ·.17  Stakeholding is a popular positioning for scholars who reject the primacy 
of shareholders and instead argue that management should take a more inclusive approach in its 
decision-making to reflect the interests of all stakeholders because all stakeholders contribute to 
the operation and success of the company. Not all scholars who identify themselves with 
stakeholding take this normative and social perspective. It is a strand of stakeholding which 
Donaldson and Preston have described as ¶LQWULQVLF· stakeholding. This perspective claims that all 
stakeholders have legitimate claims, that is, interests of intrinsic value, which deserve to be taken 
into account in the governance of the company. This contrasts with what Donaldson and Preston 
FDOO ¶instrumental VWDNHKROGLQJ· ZKHUH WKH SURPRWLRQ RI PDQ\ LQWHUHVW LQ FRUSRUDWH GHFLVLRQ-
making is justifiable in so far as it enables profit making. The premise of the intrinsic stakeholder 
perspective (among other critical scholarship) is that the economy is strong enough to sustain 
social interests and be competitive and profitable, a premise which this paper rejects.  
From this perspective, it is not the economy that is the barrier to making good managerial choices 
but undesirable social norms; a corporate culture that is too male and too greedy, or poor corporate 
governance indicators. The reform choices then become to have more women on the boards18 so 
to redress the problematic gender bias of boards, reforms that have been addressed in part 
throughout many countries and in the UK Corporate Governance Codes19 Alternatively, critical 
                                                 
16 Usually associated with Dodd in the HLR debate with Berle. Dodd n2 above. 
17 Usually attributed to the work from the Stanford Research institute in the early 1960s.  
18 &9LOOLHUV¶$FKLHYLQJ*HQGHU%DODQFHLQWKH%RDUGURRP,VLW7Lme for Legislative Action in 
WKH8."·Legal Studies 533. Reform to redress the gender imbalance in boards this 
now, in part, implemented by the UK Corporate Governance Codes.  
19 Reports from the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills headed by Lord Davis 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Women on Boards (2011) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31480/11-
745-women-on-boards.pdf and  
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scholars argue that managerial decision-making could be more progressive if the performance 
criteria upon which GLUHFWRUV·pay is based20 was decoupled from short term shareholder value 
rewards and instead linked to long term performance.21 Many different strategies have been 
proffered. Other scholars suggest raising the priority of the environment, stakeholders and long-
term development as corporate goals in the corporate governance Codes.22 Employees have also 
received attention. Margaret Blair has shown that as workers make firm specific inputs, which 
leaves them vulnerable and over-invested in their employer, they are entitled to have rights in 
corporate governance.23  
These are all strategies that I fully support as worthy goals in themselves. Many of the exponents 
of such strategies are scholars that I know and respect. However, my concern here is that they are 
offered as superior mechanisms for producing the same profits as the inferior and destructive 
methods currently used. It is the assumption that it is a zero sum game that I am challenging. 
Worse, many critical scholars argue that when companies choose to make shareholder value in a 
                                                 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Department for Culture, Media & Sport and 
Government Equalities Office, Women on Boards 2013: Two Years On (April 2013) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/182602/bis-
13-p135-women-on-boards-2013.pdf 
20 7KH8.·VFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH&RGHVKDYHWUDGLWLRQDOO\OLQNHGSD\ZLWKSHUIRUPDQFH 
21 $-:RZDNDQG'&+DPEULFN¶Current UK Corporate Governance Code A model of 
person-pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compenVDWLRQDUUDQJHPHQWV·
(2010) 31(8) Strategic Management Journal 803 . This paper suggests that the various and 
complicated performance related packages encourages risk taking and further encourages 
persons inclined to risk joining the profession.  
22 B Richardson and B Sjåfjell Company Law and Sustainability: Legal Barriers and 
Opportunities.  (Cambridge University Press. 2015)   
23 M Blair Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty First 
Century (Washington DC Brookings Institute Press 1995) 
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more socially responsible way they can actually make more shareholder value by pursuing this 
approach.24 Stout argues that the decline of the corporate sector in the UK in all but the areas of 
finance and commodities extraction can be attributed to a failure to embrace a stakeholding 
approach.25  :DOODFH·VVWXG\26 of stakeholding and company success in the United States at the end 
of the 1990s concluded that there is a direct correlation between treating stakeholders well and 
creating value for shareholders.27  However, he also notes that it was only in the extremes of poor 
behavior to stakeholders that companies lost shareholder value. Once companies improved 
stakeholder relations to a degree and shareholder value increased, additional sums allocated to 
stakeholders did not improve shareholder value any further.  
This chimes with the experience of multinational companies when their tarnished brand directly 
detracts from shareholder value and where funds allocated to improve stakeholder relations 
redresses this loss; a win-win effect. However, as many commentators have noted, this strategy 
works only in the most egregious cases of stakeholder abuse.28 For example, the well publicised 
                                                 
24 03RUWHUDQG0..UDPHU¶6WUDWHJ\DQG6RFLHW\7KH/LQN%HWZHHQ Competitive Advantage 
DQG&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\·+DUYDUG%XVLQHVV/DZ5HYLHZRQ
FUHDWLQJDIUDPHZRUNWRLQWHJUDWHVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGVWDNHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWVLQWRDSURILW
maximising strategies. Lyn Stout n 6 above.  
25 Lyn Stout n 6 above p85 
26 -:DOODFH¶9DOXH0D[LPLVDWLRQDQG6WDNHKROGHU7KHRU\&RPSDWLEOHRUQRW"
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 120. The study compared the annual Fortune ranking of 
´$PHULFD·V0RVW$GPLUHG&RPSDQLHVµRYHUWKHSHULRG-2000 so admired for their 
HYLGHQFHGVWDNHKROGHUVWUDWHJLHV¶LQQRYDWLYHQHVVTXDOLW\RIPDQDJHPHQWHPSOR\HHWDOHQW
financial soundness, use of corporate assets, long-term investment value, social responsibility, 
DQGTXDOLW\RISURGXFWVVHUYLFHV·DQGWKHLUILQDQFLDOVXFFHVVPHDVXUHGE\WKH6WDQGDUG	3RRU·V
Compustat database to compute Market Value Added (MVA). 
27ibid p120 
28 D K Millon. "Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the Redefinition of 
Corporate Purpose without Law" in Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis. Ed. P. Vasudev & 
S. Watson (Edward Elgar, 2012) with particular reference to cases like Nikes use of child labour. 
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tragedy in Rana Plaza forced brands like Primark to take responsibility for the safety of the workers 
of their ¶LQYLVLEOH·VXSSOLHUV29 who had caused workers to work in obviously dangerous conditions. 
The ensuing agreement between suppliers and their corporate customers enshrined in The 
Bangladesh Accord 2013 may result in safer conditions in BanglaGHVK·V IDFWRULHV DV ZHOO DV
repaiULQJWKHFRQQHFWHGEUDQGV· reputation.30  
However, outside these extreme examples, the argument that shareholders will do better if 
companies take better care of stakeholders is misguided. We are well acquainted with the hoary 
old neoliberal justification for shareholder primacy that managementV· focus on profit 
maximisation increases net wealth which benefits all stakeholders, WKH¶WULFNOHGRZQ·WKHRU\. We 
were amused when Kent Greenfield quipped that this theory basically asserted that managers were 
better at looking after stakeholders· interests when completely ignoring them.31 Yet, some critical 
scholars from the stakeholding position seem to think it is entirely feasible to apply the same 
perverse logic to stakeholding and assert that managers can best promote shareholders· interest by 
ignoring them. The simple and logical truth is that managers cannot take better care of 
shareholders (and therefore also their own performance related remuneration) by looking after 
stakeholders. If that worked, they would do it.  
The fact is that directors engage in the profit making strategies that they do because they are the 
best, not the worst, way to deliver shareholder value. Investing in financial products, buying back 
shares, financial restructuring and so on are better ways of delivering shareholder value than ways 
that are good for stakeholders and long term development. If they ZHUHQ·WWKH\ZRXOGQ·WEHGRLQJ
them. The real question is why are they better at delivering shareholder value? The short answer is 
                                                 
29 Talbot n8 above chapter 4  
30 -'RQDJKH\DQG-5HLQHFNH¶$IWHU5DQD3OD]D%XLOGLQJFRDOLWLRQSRZHUIRUODERXU
rights between unions and (consumption-EDVHGVRFLDOPRYHPHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQV·
Organisation 22  
31 Greenfield n1 above  
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that productive capitalism now has very low returns. The economy is changed and this means that 
although FULWLFDO VFKRODUV· QRUPDWLYH FODLPV DUH VWLOO GHIHQVLEOH WKHLU DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW their 
application would not fundamentally change capitalist performance is not.  
In order to deliver for shareholders, directors must look to other strategies than the productive 
capitalism where profits have been persistently low for some years. That strategy could be to invest 
in innovative and useful products. This would be good for society and good for employment. But 
this would involve more fixed capital investment and the risk that this may not give the desired 
returns. As Mazzucato·VH[FHOOHQWERRN shows, private investors tend to profit from WKHVWDWH·V
prior and substantial investment in research and innovation, investing at late stages of product 
development.32  In a period of low returns on capital investment they are all the more reticent to 
take on the risk of innovation. The managers of capital prefer to deliver shareholder value with 
solutions which retain liquidity and give quick returns. As the OECD recently observed productive 
companies are currently considered risky investments while paradoxically investing in financial 
commodities are considered safe. It reported that investors were selling shares in high capital 
expenditure companies and buying shares of companies with low capital expenditure. In 2009-14, 
by investing in this way they would have increased the value of their portfolios by 12% in Japan, 
21% in emerging countries, 47% in Europe and 50% in thH8QLWHG6WDWHV,Q$QJHO*XUUtD·VZRUGV
¶VWRFNPDUNHWVLQDGYDQFHGHFRQRPLHVDUHSXQLVKLQJILUPVWKDWLQYHVW·33 This risk aversion also 
accounts for the much remarked upon high levels of capital retention by top companies post crisis. 
                                                 
32 M Mazzucato The Entrepreneurial State (Anthem Press 2013) 
33http://www.oecd.org/about/secretary-general/launch-of-the-oecd-business-and-finance-
outlook-and-opening-high-level-roundtable.htm 24th June 2015 
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A recent paper argued that this retention was to offset the risks of innovation and product 
development.34   
Historically, the company has provided mechanisms to enable capital to transcend limits to 
profitability, to avoid risk, to seek out value and protect the interests of capital against labour. It is 
doing so now in this period of recession and austerity for the many, in which conversely, the elite 
(the holders of equity and other financial products) have experienced rising wealth. Increases in 
inequality, as many prominent commentators indictors like Oxfam35 have noted is on the rise.  As 
Pikketty and Harvey have noted, rising inequality is a general characteristic of recession.36 The 
company form has been particularly useful in periods of economic crisis, so that it is crises that 
accounts for its dominance as a business form. So, while it is true, as we are told as undergraduates, 
that companies became popular vehicles to pool investment, it is equally if not more accurate to 
say they are numerous because capitalism fails, at least from the standpoint of capital. The many 
circuits of crises that capitalism has entered and exited have been accompaniHGE\WKHFRPSDQ\·s 
protection of capital. This can be shown historically and it can be shown in the current period. In 
the next section I will show how and why the company form came to dominate business by the 
end of the nineteenth century and how this impacted on company law doctrine.  
 
 
                                                 
34 7:%DWHV.0.DKOHDQG506WXO]¶:K\'R86)LUPV+ROG6R0XFK0RUH&DVKWKDQ
7KH\8VHG7R"·7KH Journal of Finance 1985. This article was recently highlighted in 
0LFKDHO5REHUW·VSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\EORJ 
 
35 2[IDP¶+DYLQJLW$OODQGZDQWLQJ0RUH·
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/ib-wealth-having-all-
wanting-more-190115-en.pdf   
36 T Piketty Capital in the 21st Century (Belnap Harvard 2014)  
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Section 2 
Industrial capitalism:  Crisis, companies and the common law of companies 
As a general tendency, the productive economy has experienced progressive falls in profit rates, 
(with some upward spikes after dramatic events like World War Two).37  Historically, it is as a 
result of these falls in profit rates that the modern company rose as the dominant legal business 
form because it could protect capital in periods of crises. When the company first came to 
prominence it was its abilities to enable mergers and to reduce risk that accounted for its popularity 
with business. 
In England, general incorporation Acts with limited liability were available to the public for many 
decades before those engaged in productive capitalism began to organise their business as limited 
liability companies. In the nineteenth century when the profits accruing to industrial production 
were extremely high, the limited liability company was not popular. Its early use was confined to 
new speculative business with high rates of attrition that sought the protection of limited liability 
in the expectation of failure.38There is also evidence that the limited liability company was used by 
established businesses as an alternative form of partnership not fundamentally relying on limited 
liability in that these companies had just a few shareholders holding partly paid shares which 
enabled the creditors to look to their personal solvency as if they were still partners.39 So, despite 
a protracted battle for limited liability in the years leading up to the Limited Liability Act 1855,40 
high end profit making industrial production had no need of it. Industrial capitalism, the business 
                                                 
37 M Roberts The Great Depression (Michael Roberts 2009) 
38 +$6KDQQRQ¶7KH)LUVW)LYH7KRXVDQG/LPLWHG/LDELOLW\&RPSDQLHVDQGWKHLU'XUDWLRQ·
(1932) 3 Economic History 421 
39 -%-HIIUH\¶7KH'HQRPLQDWLRQDQG&KDUDFWHURI6KDUHV-·HFRQRPLFKLVWRU\
review 45 
40 0DULH'MHOLF¶When Limited Liability was (Still) an Issue: Mobilization and Politics of 
Signification in 19th-&HQWXU\(QJODQG·2UJDQL]DWLRQDO6WXGLHV 
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of manufacturing, was largely undertaken by partnerships in which the relationship between capital 
and labour was direct and where capital was bound to the productive process. The partners 
contributed capital to the business, managed production, disciplined labour and had full 
entitlement to the surplus made from production. Equally, their fortunes were bound to the 
success of the business and they were fully liable for the debts of the business. In law, partners 
were full owners and controllers of the business.41 In periods of high profitability this was an 
agreeable arrangement. Calculations from Maito show that the average real rate of return on fixed 
capital from 1855-1874 was 39.8%.42 However, high profitability is not a constant in capitalism. 
Competition in individual sectors, among other factors, drives business to raise ODERXU·V
productivity. In early Victorian capitalism they were free to lengthen the working day, or reduce 
wages or to introduce fines for spurious failures in performance. Victorian capitalists were fairly 
free to do with labour as they wished. There was little in the way of legal protection for labour, 
labour law was not yet conceived and trade unions were in their infancy. Indeed, this absence of 
protection led many working people to initiate their own institutions to support them through 
OLIH·VYLFLVVLWXGHV43 Another method of making labour more productive was to introduce more 
machinery into the production process. For those innovators this promised super-profits, though 
the costs of investment was high. But as competitors caught up with these levels of technology, 
profit levels evened out.  Competition forced investment in machinery driving up the cost of 
production. Through this process of making labour more productive, commodities were made 
faster and cheaper, but the production process became much more mechanised and expensive. 
Inevitably, profit rates fell. This pattern, which Marx identifies as the tendency of the rate of profit 
                                                 
41 The Partnership Act 1890 
42 (VWHEDQ(]HTXLHO0DLWR¶$QG\HWLW0RYHVGRZQ7KH:RUNHU 
43 Such as Friendly Societies and Building Societies which emerged in the C18th and then rapidly 
grew in the C19th.   
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to fall,44 affects all sectors, once they become established (new sectors achieving relatively well at 
the beginning). But as the economy as a whole is mainly composed of established sectors, there 
will be a generalised fall in profits rates.   
After many decades of innovation and high profits Victorian capitalism fell into a protracted slump 
known as the Great Depression at the end of the nineteenth century. Growth halved, 
unemployment rose and prices fell. 45 The average real rate of return on fixed capital slumped.46 It 
was in this crisis that the company form showed its utility because it provided a way to redress the 
entrenched falls in the return on capital investment. Through various mergers and incorporations, 
the many unincorporated businesses became much fewer incorporated companies.47 Competition 
was reduced, prices stabilised and many smaller capitalists were put out of business. As Marx put 
it, ¶7KH EDWWOH RI FRPSHWLWLRQ LV IRXJKW E\ FKHDSHQLQJ RI FRPPRGLWLHV 7KH FKHDSQHVV RI
commodities depend on the productiveness of labour, and the scale of production. Therefore the 
ODUJHUFDSLWDOVEHDWWKHVPDOOHU·48  
When returns on capital investment fell, the company form also enabled investors to avoid the 
risks inherent in the partnership (unlimited liability and partnership property bound to the 
business). Principally company law enables capital to become a form of money capital in that it 
                                                 
44 Karl Marx Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production Volume I, (Foreign Languages 
Publishing House Moscow 1954) p623  
45 '-&RSSRFN¶British Industrial *URZWKGXULQJWKH¶*UHDW'HSUHVVLRQ·³96): a 
3HVVLPLVW
V9LHZ·The Economic History Review 389 
46 A Kumar, K Bagchi and A Cahtterjee Marxism with and Beyond Marx (Roetledge 2015)  
47 0$8WWRQ¶6RPH)HDWXUHVRIWKH(DUO\0HUJHU0RYHPHQWLQ%ULWLVK0DQXIDFWXULQJ,QGXVWU\·
p626 (1972) 14(1) Business History 51. It was a similar trajectory in the United States, R 
Schneirov, G Fernandez, Democracy as a Way of Life in America: A History (Routledge 2014) 
p73-4 
48 Marx n44 above p626  
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retains much of the fluidity of money while holding all the entitlements of capital.  Historically, in 
order to claim profit, money must become capital, that is it must be invested in production and 
thereby lose the flexibility it had as money. In this way money, as capital, is bound to production 
until the commodities made are sold. By investing in production there are risks and uncertainties 
which are not resolved until the sale and capital becomes money once again and regains its fluidity. 
However, without embracing these risks money cannot access surplus. The ideal was to access 
surplus while reducing risk by retaining the fluidity of money. Company law enabled this by 
degrees. First, it pared down the nature of ownership of a share to the ownership of surplus value 
only, sHYHULQJDVKDUHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWIURPWKHFRPSDQ\DVVHWV Until the early part of the C19th 
DSXUFKDVHRI D FRPSDQ\ VKDUHZDV WUHDWHG LQ ODZ DV DSXUFKDVHRI WKHFRPSDQ\·V HTXLW\ DQG
shareholder were co-owners in equity. 49 Investment was bound to the production process. 
However, in the 1837 case Bligh v Brent the share was held to be a claim to the surplus created by 
the chattels purchased by the money investment, not the chattels themselves. The company share, 
at least in larger companies, thereon ceased to be a beneficial interest in the whole production 
process and in the surplus value created and became a legal and beneficial interest in the surplus 
value alone. The share became a transferable property form. But legal transferability was not 
sufficient to render capital in its share form fluid like money. This required an active and fully 
fledged stock market.50  This came later and once it did, entitlements to surplus value could be sold 
at any point in the productive cycle, in a market that was legally, culturally and geographically 
distinct from the markets in which the tangible products of the company were sold.  
The introduction of limited liability in 1855 further protected the value of the share from the debts 
of the company so that its value would be based on the expected profitability of the company 
                                                 
49 S. :LOOLVWRQ¶+LVWRUy of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800 ² SDUW,,·+DUY
L Rev, Bligh v Brent (1837) 2 Y & C 268 
50 P Ireland, I Grigg-6SDOODQG'.HOO\¶7KH&RQFHSWXDO)RXQGDWLRQRI&RPSDQ\ODZ·
Journal of Law and Society 1149 
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XQHQFXPEHUHGE\DQ\RWKHUSHUVRQ·VGHEWV So once the share was conceived in law as a separate 
piece of property and the debts of the business were conceived in law as the debts of the company, 
not the shareholders· and, once the markets for shares developed and selling shares became easier, 
capital in the form of shares could claim a fluidity close to that of money itself. Through the 
company form, the risk associated with capital was significantly reduced. Rather than being bound 
WRDSDUWLFXODUFRPSDQ\·VIDLOXUHVKRXOGWKDW transpire, shares can be sold and capital can move to 
more lucrative companies. Management will continue to owe a duty to capital, regardless of the 
ORQJHYLW\RIDVKDUHKROGHU·V ownership of a share.  
Legal developments coupled with an active market in shares gave capital its required fluidity.51 
However it was the fall in rates of profit in the Great Depression which super charged the stock 
market, unlocking the potential of shares to be quickly transferable. Businesses thereon gravitated 
to the company form.  This protracted recession led to the abandonment of small unincorporated 
business (where capital was bound to production), and their merger into larger incorporated 
companies. Much like WRGD\·V mergers boom, this was not about enhancing production but 
reducing it and thereby reducing competition. In the legal form of the company, capital could 
move to where profit was or appeared to be emerging. It was no longer attached in law or in 
practice to a particular business.  The company, unlike the partnership, enabled shareholders to 
protect themselves from risk through limited liability and by selling their shares. Actual production 
could be run by a professional management (or remaining key shareholders, or a combination of 
the two) tasked with disciplining the labour force, developing the business and providing value for 
shareholders. It was at this time that key company law doctrines were established; the doctrine of 
separate corporate personality DQGDGLUHFWRUV·ILGXFLDU\GXW\WRDFWLQWKHLQWHUHVWs of the company.  
 
(a) The Common law of Companies  
                                                 
51 ibid 
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i. Separate Corporate Personality 
By the end of the century the House of Lords held that once a business had been properly 
registered as a company it was to be treated in law as a separate legal person52 with limited liability 
(if it was registered as a limited liability company). 53 That the business in this case was essentially 
a one man business in which the other subscribers held nominal shares and did not participate in 
the business were not relevant issues in establishing the validity of an incorporation. The only issue 
was whether the formalities under the act had been conformed with or whether the incorporation 
masked a fraud. The decision in Salomon reflected the economic reality in large companies which 
were dominating the economy by the end of the century. In these companies the productive entity 
existed and competed in markets that was separate from the market in which entitlements to the 
surplus which production created were exchanged. The productive entity encompassed the 
activities of labour, managed by directors or those authorised by them. The entitlements to surplus 
were owned by shareholders who could, if they wished, have a fairly transitory relationship with 
the company. )RUPDOO\WKHVHWZR¶ZRUOGV·PHW at the annual general meeting. Following the 1897 
decision all companies would be treated as if they had the practical partitions of large companies 
(when they patently did not) because there was no legal distinction between large and small (or 
even one man) companies. In order for the share to retain the fluidity of money, the protection 
from risk and the entitlement of capital, its legal separation from the company needed to be 
unassailable. This is the principle which has dominated jurisprudence on corporate personality. 
                                                 
52 The entity nature of the company was also reflected in the doctrine of ultra vires which held 
that a company incorporated for a particular business purpose did not have the capacity to enter 
into a contract involving business activities which were not specifically noted in its constitution. 
If the company did so the contract could be declared void. Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co v 
Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653. ,QLQWHUSUHWLQJWKHFRPSDQ\·VEXVLQHVVSXUSRVHLQWKLVVWULFWPDQQHU
the courts were reflecting the distinct nature of an organisation which operated separately from 
its members. 
53 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 52 
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Although some judges have attempted to loosen the rigidity of this doctrine, notably Lord Denning 
in cases like DHN,54 the courts have responded decisively and swiftly to redress such moves. Not 
long after DHN Lord Keith stated that the veil may only be pierced ¶LQVSHFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVZKHQ
a limited company might well be a façade concealing the true IDFWV·. 55 The interests of shareholders 
ZHUHWREHIXOO\VHYHUHGIURPWKHFRPSDQ\·VOLDELOLWLHV  
 
ii. A Directors Duty to the Company  
For many decades a director·s duties have been understood by to be owed to the company. This 
point is generally made with reference to the case of Percival v Wright56 where the court held that 
the duty was not owed to the individual shareholders. Directors ZHUHWUXVWHHVRIWKHFRPSDQ\·V
property and agents of the company in its transactions. They were not agents of the shareholders. 
That being so they were entitled to make decisions which were not those desired by the 
shareholders (in Percival a high price for their shares). Does this mean that the law embraced a 
more holistic stakeholder approach to directors· duties LQZKLFKVKDUHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWZHUHMXVW
one of many interests a director would consider? I argue that it does not. British capitalism at that 
time was a capitalism of production and directors managed the company, the productive entity, in 
order to create value for the investors. Protecting the productive entity in periods of relatively high 
profits was the best way to create shareholder value. The courts understood that directors, not 
outsider shareholders, were best placed to makes these decisions.  
There is little evidence in the commercial courts of a leaning towards non-commercial decisions. 
Indeed, even in the lengthy period of growth and profitability which characterised the post Second 
                                                 
54 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852 
55 Woolfson v Strathclyde RC [1978] S.L.T. 159 
56 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421 
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World War period, in which the company was viewed by many as a vehicle for social progress,57 
the courts did not embrace a similarly social approach to the company. This is summed up neatly 
in Parke Daily News [1962] a case which assessed the relative interests of shareholders as a whole 
against those of employees and concluded that the latter could only be considered if by doing so 
the interests of the former were met.  The court held that even a majority of the shareholders were 
not entitled to ratify a proposal to pay FRPSHQVDWLRQ WR WKH FRPSDQ\·V HPSOR\HHV when the 
company faced insolvency because the best interests of the company were the best interests of 
shareholders as a whole.58 Plowman J. took issue with the claim that when directors pursued the 
best interest of the company this might be construed as the interests of employees regardless of 
any proceeding benefit to the company. He rejected the claim that although the prime duty was to 
shareholders there was also a duty to take into consideration employees. He stated that he knew 
RIQRDXWKRULW\WRVXSSRUWWKHVHFODLPVDQG¶LQP\MXGJPHQWVXFKLVQRWWKHODZ·59 Like Plowman 
J., I know of no authority to support these claims. What seems to be the consistent line from the 
case law is that as stated in Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd. 60 and cited by Plowman J. in which 
Lord Evershed M.R. VDLGWKDW¶the benefit of the company meant the benefit of the shareholders 
as a general body·61  
Wider interests, particularly those of labour, were met through political reforms, politics which 
reformed the laws on industrial relations (Parke itself precipitated the passage of the Redundancy 
Payments Act 1965), and which redressed some of the imbalance of power between labour and 
                                                 
57 CAR Crosland The Future of Socialism (Jonathan Cape 1956), Berle n 4 above, K Galbraith, 
The Affluent Society (Houghton Mifflin 1958) ,  PF Drucker, The New Society The Anatomy of 
the Industrial Order (Windmill Press, Kingswood 1951) &DUO.D\VHQ¶7KH6RFLDO6LJQLILFDQFHRI
WKH0RGHUQ&RUSRUDWLRQ·>@$P(FRQ5HY 
58 Parke v Daily News [1962] Ch 927 
59 Ibid p963 
60 [1951] Ch. 286 
61 Parke n58 above p963 
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capital.62 In respect to the company, equality was also sought through fiscal policies and the wealth 
of individual capital holders in companies, the shareholdersZDVWD[HGDW¶SXQLWLYHO\KLJKUDWHV·.63 
The top rate of taxation applicable to dividends was 90% rising to 98% from 1974-79.64 As Armour 
and Skeel show the contrasting tax policy for institutions like pension funds, which paid no tax on 
dividends, meant that private shareholders decreased in numbers while the holdings of institutions 
increased, an outcome they see as unintended.  However, far from being unintended, this reflected 
a political commitment to the rule of institutions over individuals and a belief that institutions 
enhanced equality and bureaucratic efficiency for the good of society.  It was in that same spirit 
that post war, finance had been put under state control with the nationalisation of the Bank of 
England and that utilities and other key industries were nationalised. These were some of the 
political shifts that led politicians like CAR Crosland to characterise the company as one which no 
longer pursued shareholder interests and was a creature of the community.  
But company law stands out as making no contribution to this. Indeed, in cases such as Rookes v 
Bernard, the courts seemed keen to undermine organised labour even against a parliamentary 
consensus. The House of Lords held that in threatening to go on strike unless an employee (who 
refused to re-join the union in defiance of the closed shop agreement) was moved from his 
position, the union had committed the tort of intimidation, even though Rookes (who was 
suspended and then fired by his employer) had not been directly threatened or intimidated. The 
case provoked anger from trade unions who wanted the law changed to avoid another such 
outcome ² the incumbent Conservative Party did not side with the courts but instead launched a 
Royal Commission into industrial relations.  
                                                 
62 LE Talbot Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century (Routledge 2013& 2014) chapter 2 
63 J Armour and DA Skeel ¶:KR:ULWHVWKH5XOHVIRU+RVWLOH7DNHRYHUVDQG:K\"7KH3HFXOLDU
'LYHUJHQFHRI8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG8QLWHGNLQJGRP7DNHRYHU5HJXODWLRQ·*HR/-
1768 
64Ibid p 1768 
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The courts also furthered the interests of shareholders in their approach to hostile takeovers. After 
Charles Clore made a dramatic and successful hostile takeover of Sears in 1953, many others saw 
that the discrepancy between share prices and company asset value were readily exploitable once 
they gained control as controlling shareholders. Many company directors sought to thwart these 
takeovers by, for example, using their power to issue shares to give blocking votes to insiders, or 
WRHQKDQFHWKHYRWHVDWWDFKHGWR¶VDIH·VKDUes ² companies using these methods in a sample of 
companies examined by Franks etal increased from 3.7% in 1950 to 11.1% in 1965.65 The courts 
responded by developing earlier authorities of cases like Piercy v S.Mills & Co. Ltd66 and Punt and 
Symonds Co Ltd67 into a way of striking down anti-takeover manoeuvres. Issuing shares for the 
purposes of thwarting the ambitions of a majority shareholder was found to be an abuse of 
authority and a breach of duty to the company. In contrast to Percival v Wright, in which directors 
were able to thwart a takeover if they thought it was in the interest of the company to keep the 
productive unit whole, in Hogg v Cramphorn68 directors were held to be in breach of their duty to 
the company. As they had issued shares with the primary purpose of preventing a controlling 
shareholder from gaining control (and as they believed ousting the board of directors), the 
allotment was accordingly a breach of the directors· fiduciary duties notwithstanding that their 
intention were said to be honest and selfless. Similarly the Privy Council in Howard Smith v Ampol69 
held a share allotment designed to thwart an unpopular takeover was void and a breach of the 
GLUHFWRUV·GXW\WRWKHFRPSDQ\ 
                                                 
65 -)UDQNV&0D\HUDQG65RVVL¶6SHQGLQJ/HVV7LPHZLWKWKHIDPLO\7KH'HFOLQHof Family 
2ZQHUVKLSLQWKH8.·)LQDQFH:RUNLQJ3DSHU1R(XURSHDQ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH
Institute at 4 
66 [1920] 1 Ch 77 
67 [1903] 2 Ch. 506. 
68 [1967] Ch. 254 
69 Howard Smith Ltd. Appellant v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] A.C. 821 
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In short, the law on companies has consistently HQDEOHG WKH H[SDQVLRQ RI FDSLWDO·V LQWHUHVW
regardless of shifting political policies which frequently favoured an inclusive and labour friendly 
company. There is therefore little reason to suppose that in the current non-inclusive, capital 
friendly environment that the law would adopt new allegiances.  
 
Section 2 
Financialised capitalism:  Crisis, labour, companies and modern company 
law  
 
It is important to emphasise that ZKHQWKHODZGHVFULEHGGLUHFWRUV·GXWLHVDVEHLQJRZHGWRWKe 
company it did so in the context of a predominantly productive capitalism which has since 
changed. Around forty years ago western economies entered an economic and political crisis which 
for most, and certainly for the UK and the US, saw the end of the post war social democratic 
consensus which conceptualised companies as productive institutions serving the public as a 
whole, rather than the private interests of shareholders.70 The economic prompt for this political 
shift was the slowing of the high growth rates that had characterised the post war decades up until 
the 1960s.71 By the 1970s, stagflation was entrenched in most western capitalist economies and 
this affected overall confidence in settled, corporatist arrangements. Pro-market liberal dissenters 
began to emerge as visionaries of a new form of liberalism72 and in 1979 the UK elected a new 
style Conservative government, ideologically wedded to the market and opposed to labour and the 
                                                 
70 Crosland etal n 57 above 
71 Roberts n 37 above. Though these low growth rates then would be envied in western 
economies today. 
72 D Harvey A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford 2005) 
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welfare state. Now, the relationship between labour and capital brokered by the state, often in 
favour of labour, swung decisively in favour of capital.  
The neoliberal conservative administration embarked on a series of anti-union laws to radically 
restrict collective action and reduce the powers of trade unions.73 They did so in large part to 
counter the reaction of organised labour to their new monetary policies which focused on the 
single goal of controlling inflation through high interest rates. By 1980 interest rates had risen to 
17% and by 1983 unemployment had risen to 10%. In the 1970s the unions might have defeated 
such attacks on labour but the restrictive legislation74 was already in place and the failure of the 
PLQHU·VVWULNHRI-85 left the unions in political disarray.  
Similarly, the United States elected a neoliberal government under Ronald Reagan. Under this 
administration the Federal Reserve Bank raised interest rates from their long standing flat rate to 
nearly 20% by 1981.75 Again the impact was high unemployment. To counteract the inevitable 
reaction from the (then) strong unions, the Reagan administration began a series of political attacks 
beginning, significantly, with PATCO the large, white collar and respected air traffic controllers 
union which had embarked on strike action in defiance of the government.  Of the 13,000 striking 
workers represented by PATCO 11,345 were fired and banned from federal service for life.76 
PATCO was prohibited from representing workers from then on.77  
In the neoliberal project of reasserting the power of capital over labour, both nationally and 
globally, the company became key. Organisationally it was able to transfer assets legally and 
effectively from a productive process in which policy had aimed for a broader public end, to 
                                                 
73 Talbot n 62 above  
74 The Employment Act 1980 and 1982 
75  Harvey n 70 above p23 
76 Under the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 striking government workers could lose their job, though 
the expectation was that this law would never actually be used to its full extent. 
77 By the Federal Labor Relations Authority on October 22, 1981. 
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financial interests which aimed to enhance private wealth.78  Companies rich with retained capital 
and valuable assets were re-engineered by private equity firms to extract value or were subject to 
hostile takeovers that stripped out valuable parts of the business.79 This delivered value for 
shareholders but reduced the value of the companies as working entities and encumbered the 
business with debts. Companies closed down and unemployment rose. In spite of the social 
impacts of these value destroying or transferring activities,80 takeovers were defended by neoliberal 
ideologues. Through the lens of shareholder value, takeovers enabled ¶JRRG·FRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH 
because they were said to focus management attention on profit maximisation; the so called market 
in corporate control.81 Accordingly, neoliberals argued that regulation should facilitate and not 
inhibit takeovers because they provided a market answer to agency costs.82 Takeovers benefitted 
VKDUHKROGHUVZKRDV¶residual SURSHUW\RZQHUV·LQthe company were entitled to have the company 
run (or liquidated) in their interests. Employees, in contrast, who lost their jobs in companies 
subject to takeovers, had no property interest in the company and therefore had no claims outside 
their employment contract. From industrial relations and to mergers and takeovers, the law helped 
capital profit at the expense of labour, as part of the neoliberal recovery programme. 
                                                 
78 In respect of the privatization of nationalised industries this took a more direct form of transfer 
of national assets from the public to private hands at very favourable prices for the latter. The 
justification for these transfers was deeply entrenched in neoliberal ideologies on the importance 
of private property, profitability to the economy and the upgrading of shareholders as owners of 
those profits.  
79 D Millon ¶Theories of the Corporation· (1990) 39 Duke. L. J. 201  
80 S. Deakin ¶+RVWLOH7DNHRYHUV&RUSRUDWH/DZDQGWKH7KHRU\RIWKH)LUP·-RXUQDO
of Law and Society  
81 $WKHRU\ZKLFKRULJLQDWHGZLWK+HQU\0DQQH·VSLHFHLQ+HQU\0DQQH¶0HUJHUVDQGWKH
Market for Corporate &RQWURO·-3RO(FRQ 
82 0-HQVHQDQG:0HFNOLQJ¶7KHRU\RIWKH)LUP0DQDJHULDO%HKDYLRXU$JHQF\&RVWVDQG
2ZQHUVKLS6WUXFWXUH·-RXUQDORI)LQDQFLDO(FRQRPLFV 
26 
 
 
The company form more recently has facilitated other techniques to side-step the problem of low 
profit rates. As the Kay Review of 201283 concluded, productive, non-financial companies in the 
UK have re-orientated their business to trading in financial commodities in order to meet 
shareholder value; a short-termist strategy that in many cases has meant companies have failed to 
remain competitive in their area of productive expertise. Kay laments this as wrong and short 
sighted. But however understandable this response may be, the reality is that were shareholder 
value to be found in their own business, they would not have strayed. As many other 
commentators have shown, non-financial companies have reoriented their business to that of 
being investors or dealers in financial commodities rather than being producers because that was 
where the profits lay.  
Longstanding neoliberal policies have, of course, enabled this. Dumenil and Levy·V statistics show 
how financial companies made low profits throughout Europe and in France they actually made 
losses, prior to neoliberal reforms. However, by the 1980s, their profits rose sharply, while non-
financial companies were still low. Then, by the 1990s both financial and non-financial companies 
had higher profits as non-financial companies were buying stocks in financial companies, rather 
than investing in their own low profit making businesses.84 Non-financial companies availed 
themselves of the profits accruing to financial companies because of the underlying weaknesses in 
the economy. So, as more recent work by Norfield shows, the huge growth in the derivative 
markets is the direct result of these low profit rates and while this may have accelerated the current 
crisis, derivatives themselves were not the underlying cause.85 Investing in finance seemed like the 
                                                 
83 The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets 
and Long Term Decision-Making- Final Report 2012 
84 *'XPHQLODQG'/HY\¶&RVWVDQGEHQHILWVRIQHROLEHUDOLVPDFODVVDQDO\VLV·LQ
Financialisation and the World Economy (Edward Elgar 2005) edited by Gerald A. Epsten p32-3 
85
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cure to low profit rates. This was, of course, illusory. Labour creates value, money cannot create 
money. If it looks like it is, it is a mirage, a bubble waiting to burst.  So, as Andy Haldane, Chief 
Economist and the Executive Director of Monetary Analysis and Statistics at the Bank of England, 
VKRZHGWKH¶JDLQV·PDGHE\ILQDQFHZHUHODWHUSDLGIRUE\WKHSXEOLFLQWKHLUHQWLUHW\ZKHQWKH
finance bubble finally burst.   
¶)RUWKHODUJHVWRUVRJOREDOEDQNVWKHDYHUDJHDQQXDOVXEVLG\EHWZHHQ-2010 was 
hundreds of billions of dollars; on some estimates it was over $1 trillion (Haldane 2011). 
This compares with average annual profitability of the largest global banks of about $170 
ELOOLRQSHUDQQXPLQWKHILYH\HDUVDKHDGRIWKHFULVLV· 86 
The profits may have been illusory but shareholders and directors were not required to pay them 
back. Instead the public paid for the deficit between false and true profits in full. Haldane maintains 
that this amounted to a political policy of transferring wealth to capital from the public. 
Government subsidies ² whether implicit or explicit ² cannot be said to have added to 
economic well-being in aggregate. At best, they are a sectoral re-distribution of resources 
from the general taxpayer to the banks.87 
However, there is no shift in policy and no reduction in companies seeking out profit in finance. 
And UK company law has responded. It no longer reflects the law of productive economy, it 
reflects the law appropriate to a general profit creating entity in which production is largely 
bypassed. DLUHFWRUV· ILGXFLDU\GXW\KDV UHIRUPXODWHG LQVXEWOHEXW LPSRUWDQWZD\VThe law on 
                                                 
86 A G Haldane, V Madouros ¶:KDWLVWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHILQDQFLDOVHFWRU"·9R[22 
November 2011  http://www.voxeu.org/article/what-contribution-financial-sector  
87 ibid 
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corporate purpose which shapes what directors can do to create profit has all but disappeared. 
Only the doctrine of separate corporate personality remains unchanged.  
 
Modern Company Law 
 
i. A Director·s Fiduciary duty 
Neoliberal theory and corporate governance, infected with neoliberal theory, always insisted that 
DGLUHFWRU·VGXW\ZDVWRVKDUHKROGHUV in an agent/principal relationship.88  However, iWZDVQ·WXQWLO
the 2006 reforms that the relationship was set out in the law, in section 172 of the Companies Act. 
This section represented the long deliberations of the Company Law Reform Steering Group on 
whether to adopt a stakeholder/pluralist approach or an enlightened shareholder value approach, 
conceptualised by Jenson.89 They decided on the latter, an approach which explicitly requires 
directors to act in the interests of shareholders but to consider other stakeholders when doing so. 
Thus sHFWLRQVWDWHVWKDW¶DGLUHFWRUPXVWSURPRWHWKHVXFFHVVRIWKHFRPSDQ\IRUWKHbenefit 
RI LWV PHPEHUV DV ZKROH· EXW ZKHQ GRLQJ WKLV WKH\ PXVW FRQVLGHU  D QXPEHU RI GLIIHUHQW
stakeholder and issues including employees, consumers and the likely consequence of nay decision 
in the long term. They must report on how they have made their decisions in the company annual 
report 90 but they must be guided in their decision making by the interests of the member.  
In this construction, tKHSUHVHQFHRID¶QRQH[KDXVWLYH·OLVWRIFRQVLGHUDWLRQVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDW
directors owe a duty to stakeholders, or to the long term consequences of their decision making, 
                                                 
88 Jensen and Meckling n 82 above 
89 0-HQVHQ´9DOXH0D[LPL]DWLRQ6WDNHKROGHU7KHRU\DQGWKH&RUSRUDWH2EMHFWLYH)XQFWLRQµ
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2001), pp. 8-21. 
 
90  The matters which directors may consider is set out in section 172(a)-(f) For listed companies, 
this must reported under requirements in Companies Act 2006 section 414A (previously section 
417)  
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as commentators hope it means.91 However, neither does the more focused shareholder position 
make section 172 less VWDNHKROGHURULHQWDWHGWKDQWKHFRPPRQODZ¶GXW\WRWKHFRPSDQ\·The new 
constrXFWLRQRIWKHGLUHFWRU·VGXW\merely reflects the change in economic context described above. 
Under the common law, the duty was to the company because historically the director protected 
and managed a productive entity. Today, in a period of low profits, the highly paid director will be 
investing in derivatives, in RWKHUFRPSDQLHV·equities or bonds, restructuring company capital or 
be involved in mergers unrelated to production. Anything to create shareholder value. 
Connectedly, the law on corporate purpose92 expanded by the end of the twentieth century to 
encompass most activities that made profit.93 Company law reform went a step further and there 
is now no legal requirement to have an express business purpose.94 All companies, have the same, 
singular purpose, to make profit, reducing one small REVWDFOHWRGLUHFWRUV·GHFLVLRQPDNLQJLQWKH
interests of members. So, when section 172 of the Companies Act says ¶$GLUHFWRURIDFRPSDQ\
must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of its members DVDZKROH«·P\LWDOLFVIRUWKH¶EHQHILWRILWV memberV· 
is what it means.95 Directors can have regard to stakeholders when acting for the benefit of its 
members, but no more.96 Today, that is what representing capital means. 
                                                 
91 Virginia Harper Ho "'Enlightened Shareholder Value': Corporate Governance Beyond the 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide," 36 Journal of Corporation Law 59 (2010).  
92 Discussed in footnote 52 above. 
93 Bell Houses Ltd v City Wall Properties Ltd [1966] 2 QB 656. Corporate gift giving being an 
exception.  
94 Companies Act 2006 section 30  
95 Keay has argued that this section is problematic because it is incomplete as to its interpretation 
DQGDSSOLFDWLRQDQG¶SURGXFHVDODFNRIFODULW\DVWRLWVERXQGDULHV·Keay AR and Zhang H, ¶$Q
Analysis of Enlightened Shareholder Value in Light of Ex Post Opportunism and Incomplete 
/DZ·, European Company and Financial Law Review 2011, 445-475, at 475 
96 A point I first made in Critical Company law (Routledge 2007) at pp 182-184 and in many 
subsequent papers.  
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ii. The Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality 
The doctrine of separate corporate personality remains intact. Though exceptions have developed 
in case law and in statute, they have aimed to make directors accountable and to make them avoid 
reckless or fraudulent behaviours, particularly in respect to creditors.97 The law has endeavoured 
WRHQVXUHWKDWWKHYHLOLVQRWSLHUFHGVRDVWRXQGHUPLQHWKHLQWHJULW\RIDVKDUHKROGHU·VSURSHUW\ 
/RUG.HLWK·VVWDWHPHQW LQWoolfson98 that the veil may only be pierced ¶LQVSHFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV
ZKHQDOLPLWHGFRPSDQ\PLJKWZHOOEHDIDoDGHFRQFHDOLQJWKHWUXHIDFWV·VWLOOKROGVWUXH99 Two 
UHFHQW 6XSUHPH &RXUW FDVHV DOVR WHVWLI\ WR WKH ODZ·V XQZDYHULQJ FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH Salomon 
doctrine. In VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp & Ors100 Lord Neuberger, in overruling an 
earlier case101 that had attempted to extend the scope of veil piercing, went as far as to say that veil 
piercing did not exist at all. In this he cited Lord HDOVEXU\·VMXGJHPHQWLQSalomon and his assertion 
that if one established that a company had been legally incorporated then it was not possible to 
take an action which depended on its non-existence; there cannot simultaneously be a company 
and not a company. Only statute could set aside that presumption.  
Though softening this position somewhat in Prest v Petrodel,102 Lord Sumption still offered a narrow 
window of opportunity for veil piercing when a person was attempting to evade a previously 
                                                 
97 Insolvency Act 1986 sections 212-217 
98 Woolfson v Strathclyde RC [1978] S.L.T. 159 
99 It was cited favourably in the leading case of Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch.433 and was 
UHIOHFWHGLQ/RUG0XQE\·VVWDWHPHQWVthat the veil could be lifted where there was control of the 
company by the wrongdoers and the misuse of the company by them was a façade to conceal 
their wrongdoings. %HQ+DVKHP·V&DVH[2009] 1FLR 115 
100 VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp & Ors [2013] 2 AC 337 (SC) 
101 Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Stepanovs [2011] EWHC 333 (Comm) Burton J held that the veil 
FRXOGEHSLHUFHGWRDOORZWKHFRQWUROOHUVWKH¶SXSSHWHHUV·RIDFRPSDQ\WREHVXHGXQGHUWKH
FRPSDQ\·VFRQWUDFWVDVLIWKH\ZHUHWKHPVHOYHVDFRQWUDFWLQJSDUW\ 
102 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] B.C.C. 571 Supreme Court 
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existing legal obligation through use of the core feature of a company, its separate corporate 
personality. He called this the evasion principle. The veil could be pierced if ¶D FRPSDQ\ LV
interposed so that the separate legal personality of the company will defeat the right or frustrate 
LWVHQIRUFHPHQW· 103Gilford v Horne ZDVFODVVLFH[DPSOHRIHYDVLRQEHFDXVHWKHNH\LVVXHZDV+RUQH·V
¶HYDVLYH PRWLYH IRU IRUPLQJ WKH FRPSDQ\·104 This principle for veil piercing should, Lord 
Sumption stated, be distinguished from similar caVHVZKHUH D FRPSDQ\ LV LQWHUSRVHG ¶VR DV WR
FRQFHDOWKHLGHQWLW\RIWKHUHDODFWRUV·FDVHVZKLFKIHOOXQGHUWKH¶FRQFHDOPHQW·SULQFLSOH+HUHWKH
courts could look behind the veil to see what facts the veil was concealing, without disregarding 
the veil or the integrity of the company itself.105 However, even where the evasion principle can be 
applied, the veil piercing should be limited to depriving the wrongdoer of any advantages gained 
from use of the corporate veil; and then only if the wrong could not be otherwise remedied. Only 
LQYHU\H[WUHPHFDVHVLQYDULDEO\LQYROYLQJWKHXVHRIVPDOOFRPSDQLHVZKLFKDOORZWKHFRPSDQ\·V
controllers to engage in wrongdoing, will the corporate veil be set aside.106 In practice, the 
corporate veil remains near sacrosanct, to be set aside only in extremis.  
Unlike many other doctrines in company law which have been changed and honed to enable profit 
maximisation, the doctrine of separate corporate personality remains intact. This is because this 
doctrine is so central to the preservation of share value. If the veil was pierced to set aside limited 
liability this would fundamentally undermine share values. Indeed, even a suspicion that the veil 
might be routinely dispensed with would cause massive instability in the stock market as it 
struggled to locate the value of shares once potential liabilities were factored in.  With the 
                                                 
103 Ibid p585 
104 Ibid  
105 For example, in Jones v Lipman the defendant sought to avoid selling property he was bound to 
sell by transferring it to a company. However, as he owned and controlled the company he was in 
a position to perform his obligation to the plaintiffs by exercising his powers over the company, 
veil piercing was not required. 
106 Talbot n8 above, chapter 3 
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proliferation of fictitious commodities whose real value is in any case inflated and likely to be 
adjusted downward in the near future, the modern economy is even more dependent upon the 
integrity of the corporate veil to protect values.   
 
Section 4 
Parasitism and Shareholder Value to Date 
Critics of shareholder value orientated corporate governance are understandably concerned that 
shareholder value is being achieved through destructive mechanisms which are distorting the 
economy. The title of :LOOLDP /D]RQLFN·V recent article ¶Profits without Prosperity·,107 neatly 
encapsulates where we are ² corporate management no longer attempts to create real wealth.  
Instead they keep up shareholder value through financial tinkering, specifically /D]RQLFN·V
particular concern) by repurchasing shares with existing capital or through cheap debt. American 
capitalism is particular rife with the share repurchasing strategies. In 2014, S&P 500 corporations 
bought back just over $565 billion of their own shares, an amount equivalent to around three-
quarters of their total capital expenditures.108 /D]RQLFN·VVWDWLVWLFVVKRZWKDWWKHFRPSDQLHV
that were listed in the S&P500 index from 2003-2012 spent 91% of their earning on dividends and 
share repurchases, leaving very little for innovative development or improved wages for 
employees.109 In the UK around £28.3bn was paid out in dividends during the second quarter of 
2015 in ordinary dividends alone, higher than any pre-crisis payment. This was driven by finance 
                                                 
107 :/D]RQLFN¶3URILWVZLWKRXW3URVSHULW\·+DUYDUG%XVLQHVV5HYLHZ6HSWHPEHU
https://hbr.org/resources/pdfs/comm/fmglobal/profits_without_prosperity.pdf  
108OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2015, Issue 1, p240 
http://www.oecd.org/economy/outlook/Economic-Outlook-97-Lifting-investment-for-higher-
sustainable-growth.pdf   
109 Lazonick n106 above p4 
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with the banks making the highest dividend payments.110 It is getting so extreme now that from 
the OECD to the American campaign trail,111 the wealthy are wondering how long they can keep 
making money in this way particularly given an increasingly impoverished (and massively indebted) 
consumer market.  
The pursuit of shareholder value in the context of a weak global economy is also evidenced in the 
rise of mergers and of buyouts from private equity. Pfizer and Allergan are, at the time of writing, 
in merger talks which would result in the biggest merger this year, (in what is already a bumper 
year of mergers), and the biggest ever in healthcare,112 with a joint value of $330 billion. Part of the 
attraction for Pfizer is, of course, the low corporate tax rates in Ireland. 113 However, the overriding 
impetus for all current mergers is low interest rates and low returns on capital investment in 
developing productive capacity. To continue to produce shareholder value companies buy a rival 
                                                 
110 Capita UK Dividend Monitor Issue 23, July 2015, p3 
http://www.capitaregistrars.co.uk/assets/media/Dividend_Monitor_July.pdf  The upper 
echelons of these blue chip companies represent vast quantities of capital. The FTSE 100 had a 
net market capitalisation of £1,720,093 million calculated as of the 31 March 2015, the FTSE 
250 just under one tenth of that. FTSE Factsheet 2015 
http://www.ftse.com/Analytics/FactSheets/temp/283a5945-b751-48be-974a-fbe45ba1ba3a.pdf 
111 $FDPSDLJQVSHHFKE\+LODU\&OLQWRQFRQGHPQHGVKDUHEX\EDFNVDQG¶TXDUWHUO\FDSLWDOLVP·
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/us-usa-election-clinton-speech-
idUSKCN0PY0AY20150724 25th July 2015 
112 Healthcare has seen a huge rise in mergers, increasing the cost of healthcare provision.  
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/slideshow/healthcare-mergers-and-acquisitions-2015-
running-list  
113 -GHOD0HUFHGDQG/3LFNHURFW¶3IL]HU%LGIRU$OOHUJDQ+DV,WV(\HVRQ,UHODQG·1<7LPHV
30/10/2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/business/dealbook/allergan-pfizer-
deal.html?_r=0 M 
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businesses to reduce costs, competition and to keep prices stable.114 It also increases incumbent 
managementV· empire and thus their own remunerations as well as providing high rewards for the 
finance providers. For ordinarily paid workers reducing costs means loss of jobs.  In the UK, 
private equity groups engage in a multi-billion pound business in both equity buyouts and sales.  
According to a survey by the Centre for Management Buyout Research, in the first half of 2015 
there were more than 100 UK buyouts worth £10.5bn overall. In the first half on 2015, buyouts 
were up 33% on the first half of 2014. 115 No institution is free from private equity. Over 18% of 
2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\·VEQHQGRZPHQWIXQGLVPDQDJHGE\SULYDWHHTXLW\IXQGVXSIURPLQ
2012. 116 The artifice driven buoyancy of the share market is also prompting record sales of private 
equity investments. In the first half of 2015 private equity sold almost £22bn of past investments.117 
Cinven recently sold its last share in Spire, a group of UK private hospitals that it bought in 2007. 
In the US, after holding on to First Data Corp in a buyout which cost KKR $30bn the corporation 
is starting the first of an expected series of IPOs. The first IPO is valued at around $100 million. 
                                                 
114 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/11/mergers-and-acquisitions-madness-
may-be-about-to-stop business leader 
115 -RVHSK&RWWHULOO¶%X\RXWILUPVPRYHGHHSHULQWR8.SXEOLFVHUYLFHV·)7July 13, 2015  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5eb941da-26dc-11e5-bd83-71cb60e8f08c.html#axzz3gZ4osEEl  
116 0DGLVRQ0DUULDJH¶University of Oxford doubles exposure to private eTXLW\·)7July 19, 2015  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c47821e8-2bdd-11e5-acfb-cbd2e1c81cca.html#axzz3gZ4osEEl  
117 -RVHSK&RWWHULOO¶%X\RXWILUPVPRYHGHHSHULQWR8.SXEOLFVHUYLFHV·)7July 13, 2015  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5eb941da-26dc-11e5-bd83-71cb60e8f08c.html#axzz3gZ4osEEl 
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As the majority shareholder, KKR was able to require First Data to bRUURZ WR UHSD\ ..5·s 
investment so by 2015 First Data had $20.5bn net debt.118  
In contrast the prosperity enjoyed by those who wealth lies in shares and finance, labour has 
experienced sharp falls is wages, job security and state imposed austerity. However, in a somewhat 
perverse twist, the loss to labour has partly been masked by the company form as the newly 
unemployed have become self-employed in the absence of alternatives and organised as private 
companies. According to the BIS ¶,QUHFHQW\HDUVWKHPDMRULW\RIEXVLQHVVSRpulation growth has 
been amongst non-employing businesses (of all types); 91% of total growth since 2000 and 80% 
RIJURZWK LQ WKH ODVW \HDU·119 ¶%XVLQHVVHVZLWKQRHPSOR\HHV· DFFRXQWHG IRURIDOOSULYDWH
sector businesses (4 million in total), 17% of private sectors employment and 7% of private sector 
turnover.120 The UK continues to have the highest levels of self-employment in the EU, indicative 
of a weak labour market.121  Even for those employed, 697,000 people were on zero-hours 
contracts for their main job between October and December 2014. That represents 2.3% of the 
UK workforce.122 For full-time employees, between 2009 and 2013 real earnings have fallen on 
average 7.5%.123  
                                                 
118 ¶)LUVW'DWDVHFRQGFKDQFH·)7July 21, 2015 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/6f068118-2f62-
11e5-8873-775ba7c2ea3d.html#axzz3gZ4osEEl  
 
119 BIS Business Population Estimates For the UK and Regions 26 November 2014 Statistical 
Release Reference: URN 14/92 p2 
120  ibid p5 
121 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/aug/12/uk-self-employment-capital-western-
europe-ippr-recovery 
122 216¶$QDO\VLVRI(PSOR\HH&RQWUDFWVWKDWGRQRW*XDUDQWHHD0LQLPXP1XPEHURI+RXUV·
25 February 2015 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_396885.pdf 
123 216¶8.:DJHV2YHUWKH3DVW)RXU'HFDGH·V-XO\
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_368928.pdf 
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All this might seem a relatively modest transfer of value from labour to capital in the recent period, 
given a global financial crisis, until one considers the amount the public has paid for this. Sovereign 
debt in the UK is stands at £1.26 trillion, just over double that in 2009. It is just under 80% of 
GNP.124 And the underlying decline continues. In the United States corporate profits are down 
0.8% in 2014 compared to 2013 the decline in the FTSE 100 has continued.125 Still companies 
have only one solution, buy back more shares. Shareholders demand it and governments oblige 
with low interest rates. The precipice of economic decline is beckoning.  
 
 
Conclusion  
When critical scholars deplore myopic shareholder orientated corporate goals and formulate 
socially progressive reform it is vital to understand or to re-understand that these anti-social 
strategies were, and are, a reaction to pre-existing weaknesses in the economy. This package of 
strategies was a neoliberal reaction to the weaknesses, one that catastrophically chose the exact 
moment of low profit rates to make the achievement of shareholder value paramount. These 
parasitical strategies will undoubtedly precipitate another and much worse crisis soon ² but it 
ZDVQ·WDOULJKWWKHQLWZHQWDOOZURQJ  ,PSRUWDQWO\IRUUHIRUPHUVWRGD\WKDWPHDQVWKDWZHFDQ·W
just do capitalism differently and expect it to succeed. The weakness was that the productive 
economy was not delivering the profits that it once had. So the neoliberal solution was to use the 
company in other ways than making profit through production.   
I have argued that the law as it stands is not a source of resistance. Under English common law a 
GLUHFWRUV·GXW\was owed to the company, but now under the Companies Act 2006 directors owe 
                                                 
124 http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_national_debt_chart.html 22 July 2015 
125 Latest decline as of writing this http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33619756 22 July 2015 
revised 30th October http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/business-34617910  
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a duty to act in the interests of the members as a whole. This is a direct requirement to represent 
the interest of shareholders. But even when the common law required directors to act in the 
interest of the company, this was not a duty to be more socially responsible or more inclusive. It 
ZDVDUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWVKDUHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWs were represented through the productive entity. In 
the period of financialised capitalism this is of secondary importance.  
Secondly, I have argued that most, critics of shareholder primacy, do not oppose profit making, 
MXVW¶EDG·shareholder-driven profit making. But this is a product of the amnesia imposed on us by 
neoliberalism. Critical scholars now believe there is a choice between good productive stakeholder 
capitalism and bad parasitical shareholder-value capitalism. That was not the choice forty years ago 
when growth was higher and inequality so much lower. It is even less the choice now. Neoliberals 
have responded to entrenched low profit rates (albeit unevenly experienced globally) by using the 
company mainly for purposes other than that of production so that there is a continuous 
disconnect between share value and production.126 Their driving logic is shareholder value. Its 
outcome will be an ever more degraded productive economy, deeper and more frequent crises and 
intensified attacks on labour and social welfare. These are the necessary causalities of attempts to 
protect capital. But if the driving logic of reformers is that there is a more socially responsible way 
to do capitalism successfully, they too will fail. Creating value for shareholders is not compatible 
creating an economy that delivers for people. Today shareholder value is best created by 
squandering funds on financial restructuring at precisely the point when an economy-for-people 
needs to develop productive and innovative capacity. Capitalism is failing to deliver what it once 
could (for shareholders and society) because of the nature of capitalism. Radical solutions will be 
needed to preserve industries that provide useful things for people but which doQ·W provide 
shareholder value. Radical initiatives must encourage the innovations that have traditionally been 
                                                 
126 The FTSE 100 rose again at the very point that manufacturing slows down. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32545887 
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FDSLWDOLVP·V VDYLQJ JUDFH, but in a degenerate finance capitalism have become expensive risks. 
Today, radicals must dig deeper when critiquing the modern company and ask whether capitalism 
itself has a future and if so, is it a future that we want?  
 
 
 
 
 
